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Abstract
We examine the effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs) on ambient concentrations of PM10 in the United States between 1990 and 2005. We find that non-attainment
designation has no effect on the ‘average monitor’ in non-attainment counties, after controlling
for weather and socioeconomic characteristics at the county level. In sharp contrast, if we allow
for heterogeneous treatment by type of monitor and county, we do find that the 1990 CAAAs
produced substantial effects. Our best estimate suggests that PM10 concentrations at monitors with concentrations above the national annual standard dropped by between 7µg/m3 and
9µg/m3 , which is roughly equivalent to a 11-14% drop. We also show that monitors which were
in violation of the daily standard experience two fewer days in violation of the daily standard the
following year. Empirical results suggest that this treatment effect is independent of whether
the EPA has finalized the non-attainment designation.
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1.

Introduction

Two empirical regularities characterize the changes in the spatial distribution of particulate matter
less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10 ) in the United States between 1990 and 2005: First, average
county level ambient concentrations of PM10 dropped by about 18%. Second, there was substantial
spatial heterogeneity in reductions of PM10 . Monitors which recorded ambient concentrations above
the federal standard experienced drops that were greater than the average of the remaining monitors
in the same county.
This naturally raises the following two questions: First, what is the effect of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments (CAAAs) on ambient concentrations of PM10 ? Second, what is the level of spatial
aggregation - county versus monitor level - needed for the effects of the regulation to be properly
captured? This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by combining monitor level data
on annual average PM10 concentrations from the EPA’s Air Quality System (AQS) between 1990
and 2005 with data from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) on county PM10 attainment status.
We ask whether county non-attainment status is responsible for the drops in PM10 experienced in
non-attainment counties.
Further, we examine the spatial distribution of these changes. The need for a spatially disaggregate analysis arises from the way the regulation is written, which in turn was likely motivated
by the understanding of the health effects. The NAAQS specifies that a county is designated as
non-attainment if any of the monitors within the county are in violation of the federal standard.
This may lead to a heterogeneous treatment effect within counties, where local regulators focus their
attention on monitors recording concentrations in violation of the federal standard and “ignore” the
remaining monitors in the county.1
The epidemiological literature on the mortality impacts of particulate matter provides a clear
motivation why federal regulators focused their attention on dirtier areas when designing the regulation. Early studies examining the dose response function for particulate matter and mortality
assumed that the logarithm of mortality is linear in concentrations, suggesting a non-linear relationship between mortality and concentrations [6]. This convex damage function implies that reducing
ambient concentrations at a dirty location by e.g. 10 µg/m3 of PM10 may lead to a better overall
1
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health outcome than reducing concentrations by the same amount at a cleaner location. Only a
spatially disaggregated analysis will have the ability to disentangle these heterogenous impacts of
regulation.
Over the years, researchers have made considerable strides in measuring the effects of federal
environmental regulations on ambient concentrations of several criteria pollutants. Studies vary by
the time period, type of pollutant and level of data aggregation (county averages versus monitor level
observations). [11] investigated the effects of ground level Ozone regulations in the United States for
the period 1977-1987 on air quality and the migration of polluting facilities using concentrations of
Ozone measured at the monitor level. He finds that county non-attainment status - the centerpiece of
the CAAAs - led to a statistically significant 8.1% decrease in the median daily maximum concentrations for the month of July. He finds a weak or not statistically significant effect for three additional
measures of Ozone concentrations examined.2 Along the same lines, [2] and [3] examined the effects
of total suspended particulates (TSPs) on infant health and capitalization of air quality into property
values induced by the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments. In their first stage regressions they find
a statistically significant effect of predicted non-attainment status on mean annual concentrations
of TSPs averaged to the county level. The estimated impact is between 9-12% for 1971-72 TSP
concentrations and 11-12% for the 1975-76 non-attainment status on the difference between 1977-80
and 1969-72 concentrations. Both of these papers use ambient concentrations averaged across all
monitors for each county. More recently, [9] examined the effects of the 1970 and 1990 CAAAs on
county averaged Sulfur Dioxide (SO2 ) concentrations. Using difference-in-difference and propensity
score matching techniques, he shows evidence that the non-attainment designation at the county level
did not have a detectable impact on average within county monitor concentrations for non-attainment
counties.
Our interest here lies in examining whether due to the lack of a spatially-disaggregated analysis
that can capture the heterogeneity in regulatory impact on ambient concentrations, these studies may
have potentially “averaged out” the true effects of environmental regulation. This issue arises if air
quality managers focus their regulatory efforts on “dirtier” parts of counties and reduce ambient
concentrations by substantially larger amounts there as compared to “cleaner” areas of the same
county. By averaging concentrations across low concentration and high concentration monitors for a
2
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given county one potentially averages away a source of policy induced variation. In the extreme case,
this averaging could lead one to conclude that policy is responsible for only minor or no reductions
in ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants. They may have, however, reduced concentrations
significantly in the worst air quality regions, yet have left air quality somewhat constant in the cleaner
parts of a county.
Studies using monitor level data suffer from a similar version of this problem, since they estimate an average treatment effect for all monitors in non-attainment counties. By modeling regulatory
impacts via a non-attainment dummy, the estimated coefficient captures the average effect of nonattainment status across all monitors in a county. If there is underlying heterogeneity, one may falsely
conclude that policy had no impact on ambient concentrations.
Finally, these studies implicitly assume that there is no regulatory effect in attainment counties.
This assumption is only valid if the threat of non-attainment status designation does not lead to
changes in monitor level concentrations in attainment areas.
This paper differs from the prior literature in three distinct ways. First, we look at the impact
of federal air quality regulation on particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter, which is often
considered to be the “pollutant of the 90s”. Second, while we conduct our analysis at the monitor
level (as does [11]) we allow the regulation to have a differential effect on concentrations measured
at the monitoring site depending whether a county is in attainment or not and whether a specific
monitor was in violation of the federal standard in the previous period. Finally using previously
unavailable weather data, we are able to control for weather impacts at the monitor (instead of the
county average) level, allowing for within county heterogeneity of rainfall and temperature.
We address these issues by combining annual average concentrations of PM10 at the monitor
level between 1990 and 2005 with county attainment designations for PM10 . Additional data were
collected to account for other determinants of changes in PM10 , including climate and economic
activity. We further control for monitor and year fixed effects as well as monitor specific time trends
to remove any unobservable confounding factors constant and/or varying by monitor and year.
We use these data to estimate two sets of models. The first is a model that, for PM10 ,
replicates existing studies of the effects of environmental regulations at the county level on other
criteria pollutants [9]. The second is a more spatially disaggregated model where we allow for the
3
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possibility of heterogeneous impacts of the regulation based on the concentration at monitors which
recorded concentrations in violation of the federal standard. We estimate these two sets of models
separately for violations of the annual and daily federal standard.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of PM10
regulation; section 3 describes the data sources and provides summary statistics on the trends in
monitoring and PM10 concentrations between 1990 and 2005. Section 4 presents the econometric
models and section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes.

2.
2.1

Basic Aspects of PM10 Regulation
Brief Historical Facts About PM10 Regulation

Particulate Matter is a term used for a class of solid and liquid air pollutants. Total suspended
particulates (TSPs) include particles less than 100 microns in diameter. The 1971 Clean Air Act
authorized the Environmental Protection Agency to enforce a National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS) for TSPs. The standards for TSPs were phrased as primary and secondary standards.
“Primary standards set limits to protect public health, including the health of sensitive populations
such as asthmatics, children, and the elderly. Secondary standards set limits to protect public welfare,
including protection against decreased visibility, damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings”
(see [16] for further discussion). Each standard is defined in terms of an annual benchmark average as
well as 24 hour benchmarks. From April 30th 1971 until July 1st 1987 the primary annual standard
for TSPs was 260 µg/m3 for the 24-hour average and 75 µg/m3 for the annual average. The secondary
standard for TSPs was 150 µg/m3 for the 24-hour average and 60 µg/m3 for the annual average [13].
If a single monitor within a county exceeded the primary annual standard for one year or the
primary 24-hour standard for more than a single day per year the entire county was considered to
be in violation of the standard. By provisions in the Clean Air Act, the EPA can move to designate
a county “non-attainment”. After a lengthy review process, a non-attainment county was required
to submit, in a state implementation plan (SIP), the strategy that it intends to use to become in
attainment with the NAAQS. If the deficiency remains uncorrected, or if the EPA “finds that any
4
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requirement of an approved plan (or approved part of a plan) is not being implemented”, the county is
given 18 months to correct the deficiency. If the deficiency is not corrected the EPA administrator may
impose sanctions on the county in violation, including the withholding of federal highway funds, and
the imposition of technological “emission offset requirements” on new or modified sources of emissions
within the county [14]. In the first stage of the sanctioning process only one of the sanctions is applied
at the discretion of the EPA Administrator; if the county continues to be in violation 6 months after
the first sanction, then both are applied. These sanctions are enforced not at the state level, but at
the political subdivisions that “are principally responsible for such deficiency” [13].
In 1987, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency refined their particulate policy to regulate
particulates less than 10 micrometers in diameter (PM10 ). The new standard required the annual
arithmetic mean of PM10 concentration for each monitor in a county to be less than 50 µg/m3 . It
further required that the 24 hour average concentrations at a monitor do not exceed 150 µg/m3 .
In contrast to TSPs, for PM10 the primary and secondary standards were identical. This change
was implemented because a growing body of scientific evidence indicated that the greatest health
concern from particulate matter stemmed from PM10 , which can penetrate into sensitive regions of
the respiratory tract.3

2.2

Local Regulatory Behavior

To understand the behavior of the local regulator, we emphasize the fact that federal regulators set
federal standards with the understanding that the ultimate goal of the regulation is to protect public
health. As such, and because of the non-linearities between pollution levels and health impacts, the
federal regulator requires that, for a county to be in attainment, none of the monitors in that county
can exceed the primary annual standards. The local regulators objective in turn is to minimize costs
for the county. These costs consist of regulation costs (e.g. fines and SIP) as well as costs to lower
PM10 levels. The federal regulation creates an incentive for the local regulator to closely track the
monitors that put the county at risk of becoming out of attainment. The regulator then allocates
effort in terms of monitoring and enforcement activities to the different monitors by comparing the
future costs of getting out of attainment to the present costs associated with the reduction in the

5
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emissions around risky monitors. The resulting equilibrium is a schedule of heterogeneous monitoring
efforts such that more effort is allocated to dirtier monitors, resulting in the maximized net benefit
of emissions reductions.

2.3

Sources of PM10 Pollution

Particulate matter enters the atmosphere in one of two ways: primary particulate matter is emitted
directly into the atmosphere as a solid or liquid; secondary particulate matter is formed in the
atmosphere by reactions between precursor gases such as organic gases, nitrogen oxides (NOx ), and
sulfur oxides (SOx ). In general, the contribution of the secondary PM10 precursor gases to total
ambient PM10 is substantially larger than the contribution of primary particulate matter.
In California, for example, the California Air Resources Board estimates that in the year 2000,
there were approximately 2,400 tons of primary PM10 emitted on a daily basis. Of these 2,400 tons,
6% was emitted by stationary industrial sources, 5% was emitted directly from mobile sources, 15%
was generated from paved roads, and the remaining 74% was produced by area-wide sources. The
area-wide sources include residential fuel combustion (7%), farming operations (9%), construction
and demolition (9%), unpaved road dust (27%), fugitive windblown dust (12%), and burning and
waste disposal (10%).
In addition to the primary PM10 emissions, 10,847 tons of secondary PM10 precursor gases
were emitted into the atmosphere on a daily basis in California in the year 2000. These precursor
gases include 3,591 tons of NOx , 333 tons of SOx , and 6,923 tons of organic gases [1]. The actual
contribution of the secondary PM10 precursor gases to ambient PM10 concentration levels depends on
the ambient concentrations of the precursor gases themselves, as well as the atmospheric chemistry
of the region, including the relative humidity, temperature, wind speed and direction [8]. In this
case one may find two areas with similar secondary PM10 precursor gas releases that have different
secondary PM10 ambient concentrations, depending on their location-specific characteristics. In the
case of the South Coast Air Basin, the PM10 reduction efficiency calculations, which allow one to
estimate the primary and secondary emissions required to produce a single unit increase in the
ambient concentration of PM10 , indicate that NOx emissions in 1990 contributed to over half of the

6
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total ambient PM10 concentration [8].

3.

Overview of the Trends in PM10 Concentra-

tions and Regulations
To implement the analysis, we compiled the most detailed data available on concentrations, attainment status and other relevant determinants of concentrations, including climate and economic
activity. This section describes the data sources and presents summary statistics on national trends
in PM10 , the distribution of monitors and mean concentrations.

3.1

PM10 Concentrations and Attainment Status Data

The concentrations data were obtained from the Air Quality Standards (AQS) database, which is
maintained by the EPA. For each PM10 monitor reporting to the EPA, these data include a number
of monitor characteristics including the location of the monitor. Title 40 Part 58.12 and Title 40 Part
50 Appendix K of the Code of Federal Regulations prescribe the monitoring frequencies for PM10
monitors, as well as criteria for establishing whether a monitor is “representative” and therefore
should be used in rule making.4 For estimation purposes, we used the valid weighted annual mean at
each monitor, which was provided by the EPA.5
The annual county attainment status designations were copied from the annual CFR. Since for
PM10 the primary and secondary standards are identical we have a single indicator of non-attainment
for each county and year.

3.2

Additional Data: Attainment Status for other criteria pollutants,
Climate and Economic Activity

We supplement the data on PM10 concentrations and attainment status with additional relevant data,
reflecting the need to capture other determinants of the change in PM10 . Since attainment status
is not only assigned for PM10 , but for five other criteria pollutants, it is important to separate the
7
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impact of policy induced reductions in precursor emissions to the pollutant of interest. We therefore
control for yearly county non-attainment status for TSP, Ozone, SOx and NOx collected from the
CFR.6
In addition to regulation, there are other physical factors influencing ambient concentrations
of PM10 . Temperature and rainfall affect the formation of secondary PM10 as well the presence of
primary particulates. Since microclimates vary greatly within states and large counties, we do not use
county averages, but use rainfall and temperature at the monitor location. We control for February
and July rainfall and temperatures, which have been shown to be highly correlated with particulate
concentrations, since they proxy for how cold/wet each winter was and how warm/dry each summer
was at the monitor level. We use the [15] dataset, which provides monthly data based on all US
weather stations extrapolated to a set of 4 km2 grids covering the continental United States between
1990 and 2005, allowing us to construct weather observations at the pollution monitor location.
Finally, emissions of particulate matter are strongly correlated with economic activity. While
GDP is not available at the county level, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) releases annual
estimates of personal income at the county level. This indicator has been widely used in the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature at the state level [12]. We include the real personal income for
each year and county in our sample. We also control for population and employment, using county
level estimates reported by the BEA. In the econometric analysis we will further control for monitor
specific time variant and invariant unobservables.

3.3

National Trends in Monitoring and Concentrations

Table I presents annual summary information for the monitors included in our analysis. The second
column reports the number of active monitors for each year. As a result of the 1990 CAAAs, both the
number of operating monitors and the geographical coverage of PM10 readings increased substantially
between 1988 and 2005. The number of active monitors increased roughly fourfold between 1988 and
1996; as the third column indicates, the number of monitored counties increased from 173 in 1988 to
543 in 1997. The peak in PM10 monitoring in 1997 is not surprising, since federal regulators began
a national program to monitor PM2.5 levels in 1997. At the peak of monitoring 172 million people

8
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lived in counties with at least one valid monitor, which represents roughly 65% of the US population.
Column (5) shows the number of monitored non-attainment counties. In 1990, for example, 64
non-attainment counties had at least one monitor satisfying the EPA data requirements mentioned
above. Column (6) displays the complete count of counties designated as non-attainment. In 1990,
76 counties were designated as being in non-attainment. The numbers in brackets report the counties
being newly designated as non attainment and back in attainment for each year respectively. From
1993 to 1994, for example, six counties were newly designated as being out of attainment raising
the number of non-attainment counties from 77 to 83. From 1994 to 1995 one county was newly
designated as being out of attainment and two counties were designated as being back in attainment
bringing the number of non-attainment counties down to 82 from 83. Identification in our model
comes from the monitors which are located in counties that go into or out of attainment over the
period covered by our sample. These monitors account for 22% of the monitors in the sample.7 Figure
(1) displays the spatial distribution of monitored counties by attainment status for our sample. The
overall spatial distribution of monitors reflects the EPA’s concerns of measuring concentrations in
highly populated areas.
Columns (7) and (8) in Table I indicate that average annual concentrations across all monitors
show a 18% decrease between 1990 to 2005. In addition the variability in emissions as measured by the
standard deviation has decreased by roughly 14%. For the entire sample the overall standard deviation
of ambient concentrations is 8.93 µg/m3 , while the within monitor standard deviation is much smaller
at 3.62 µg/m3 . Column (9) of the table displays the number of monitors in each year, which are in
violation of the daily standard, which also displays a downward trend. The question central to this
paper is to determine how much of this drop at which type of monitor is due to the CAAAs. Figure
(2) shows the trend of average annual concentrations in counties which were always in attainment in
the left panel. The right panel shows the trend in average ambient concentrations for counties which
were designated as non-attainment for at least one year of our sample. In absolute terms both types of
counties experienced a drop in mean concentrations of about 10µg/m3 between 1988 and 2005. Casual
inspection of this figure could lead one to conclude that county-level attainment status does not have
a detectable impact on average concentrations. The goal of this paper is to determine whether indeed
attainment status affects all monitors in non-attainment counties, or whether regulation affects only
9
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monitors with concentrations above the federal standard.
Before attempting to identify the effects of regulation using econometric methods, it is worth
examining trends at three types of monitors at the time regulation was first introduced. Figure (3)
examines the changes in mean concentrations at a) monitors in counties which were in attainment
throughout the period of our sample (the control group) b) monitors in counties that were designated
as non-attainment in 1990, yet had concentrations below the federal standard and c) monitors in
counties that were designated as non-attainment in 1990, yet had concentrations above the federal
standard. The figure centers the three series according to their 1990 average concentration. The figure
shows quite clearly that the monitors in attainment counties (dotted line) and the attainment monitors
in non-attainment counties (triangles) followed an almost identical trajectory. The trajectory for
monitors in non-attainment counties which were in violation of the standard, is quite different. The
average concentrations at these monitors were increasing leading up to the regulation year 1990, which
is when a sharp trend reversal occurred and concentrations began to drop. Two years after the first
non-attainment status designations were put in place, concentrations at these dirties monitors were
roughly 6.5 µg/m3 lower than right before the designation year. This graphical evidence motivates
us to examine this effect conditional on confounding variables at the monitor level using econometric
methods, which is what we turn to in the next section.

4.

Econometric Model

In this section, we describe the econometric strategy adopted to measure the effects of the CAAAs
on changes in concentrations. Let Dj,t be an indicator variable that equals one when county j
is designated as non-attainment in year t and 0 if it is in attainment. Let Yi,tj denote the PM10
concentrations of monitor i in county j in year t. Consistent with the literature, our basic econometric
model is equation 1 below:
Yi,tj = α1 Dj,t + X j,t β + P i,t ϕ + θt + δi + ηi,t

(1)

where α1 is the parameter of interest and measures the difference in PM10 concentrations between
10
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non-attainment and attainment counties. Formally, α1 represents the average treatment effect of
attainment status in non-attainment counties, and is given by:
h

i

h

α1 = E Yi,tj |Dj,t = 1; X j,t , P i,t − E Yi,tj |Dj,t = 0; X j,t , P i,t

i

where X j,t is a vector of controls, which vary over time at the county level. These include nonattainment status of monitors in county j for other criteria pollutants (i.e TSP, NOx, SOx and
Ozone) in the same year that Dj,t is measured, as well as county-level measures of income, population
and employment. P i,t is a vector of controls, which vary at the monitor level. In this paper we
include rainfall and temperature at the monitor level, as described in the data section. θt is a year
fixed effect that is common to monitors located in attainment and non-attainment counties, δi is a
monitor fixed effect that controls for monitor specific unobservables that are invariant over time and
ηi,t is the idiosyncratic unobserved error component. As is standard in the literature, we estimate
model (1) in first differences, which eliminates the monitor fixed effects:

∆Yi,tj = α1 ∆Dj,t + ∆X j,t β + ∆P i,t ϕ + θt + ∆ηi,t .

(2)

From an estimation point of view, a specification in differences is conservative, since we remove
monitors which only have single years satisfying the EPA criteria. Differencing effectively limits
us to sites which report at least two adjacent years of data. The model described by equation
(1) is appropriate to measure the average effect of attainment status on the average PM10 county
concentrations. However, it does not allow us to disentangle the potential differential impact of the
non-attainment status on the three types of monitors of interest. We define a variable OOCi,t , which
is equal to one if monitor i had a recorded year t mean annual concentration greater than the federal
standard of 50µg/m3 and zero otherwise. We estimate two augmented specifications below, which
allow us to test for heterogeneous treatment effects at the three types of monitors:
∆Yi,tj = α1 ∆Dj,t + α2 ∆Dj,t · OOCi,t−1 + ∆X j,t β + ∆P i,t ϕ + θt + ∆ηi,t ,

(3)

∆Yi,tj = α1 ∆Dj,t + α2 ∆Dj,t · OOCi,t−1 + α3 ∆(1 − Dj,t ) · OOCi,t−1 +

(4)

11
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∆X j,t β + ∆P i,t ϕ + θt + ∆ηi,t .

The coefficient interpretation for α1 in equation (3) remains the same as in the standard
model given by equation (2). It captures the average change in concentrations at monitors in nonattainment counties. α2 captures the average drop in concentrations at monitors which exceeded the
federal standard and are located in non-attainment counties. One could regard this as a treatment
of having exceeded the standard in a previous period. This specification only allows regulation to
affect ambient concentrations in non-attainment counties - albeit differentially for monitors in and
not in violation of the federal standard. We include OOCi,t−1 as a lag in levels since non-attainment
designation is based on concentrations in the past. Since the relevant unit of measurement is average
concentrations over a calendar year, regulators will take action if they observe that the criterion for
regulatory action is exceeded. Regulatory action will affect ambient concentrations with a lag, since
air quality managers do not directly control emissions sources. As a robustness check consistent with
[11], we also ran our models including Dj,t−1 instead of Dj,t and the results are virtually identical.
In equation (4) we allow for a heterogenous impact of regulation on concentrations. The
coefficient interpretation for α1 captures the drop in concentrations at monitors not-in violation of
the standard in counties which are designated as being out of attainment. α2 captures the average
drop in concentrations at monitors which have exceeded the federal standard in these non-attainment
counties. α3 captures the average drop in concentrations at monitors which have exceeded the federal
standard yet are located in attainment counties. A county can be in attainment even if a single monitor
was in violation of the federal standard in the previous year since non-attainment designation is based
on a three-year average, not a single year.
If the CAAAs did indeed not have an effect on ambient concentrations, we would expect all
α parameters to be statistically insignificant. However, a finding of α1 < 0 would imply that local
regulators targeted all monitors in non-attainment counties, regardless of whether a specific monitor
location was in violation of the federal standard or not. A finding of α2 < 0 would suggest that nonattainment status designation led to decreases in ambient concentrations at monitors in violation of
the standard in the previous period. A finding of α3 < 0 would suggest that there was a reduction in
ambient concentrations at violating monitors in attainment counties following an exceedance of the
12
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federal standard. This outcome would suggest that the CAAAs do not only work through the actual
designation yet also through the threat of future non-attainment designation. Finally, it is not just
the absolute but also the relative magnitude of the coefficients. Specifically, a finding of α2 < α1
would suggest that regulators focus more on the dirtiest monitors to reach attainment (since these
are expected to be negative). A finding of α2 < α3 would suggest that regulators engage in higher
effort when the costs of regulation are highest since they are being forced to take actions to return
to attainment status through the State Implementation Plan.

5.

Results

Table II displays the central results from the estimation conducted in differences. The entries are the
parameter estimates and their estimated standard errors in parentheses, which are calculated using a
covariance matrix clustered at the county level.8 In all models we control for income, February and
July temperature and precipitation non-linearly as quadratics. In addition, as in [9], we control for
annual county population and employment.9
Model (1) provides the estimates for equation (2). The key finding from the first specification
is that, after controlling for weather and socioeconomic characteristics as well time invariant unobservables at the monitor level, the county non-attainment designation does not explain a statistically
significant share of the variation in PM10 concentrations. In fact, the point estimate of the coefficient
is an increase in ambient concentrations of 0.173 µg/m3 , yet this is not statistically different from
zero.
Once we estimate the augmented specification given in equation (3), we show that the significance and magnitude of the parameter estimate for α1 does not change, yet the coefficient estimate
for α2 is large and statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The interpretation of this point
estimate is that ambient concentrations at monitors, which have recorded concentrations above the
50 µg/m3 annual standard, have experienced a drop in concentrations of 5.43 µg/m3 relative to
compliant monitors in non-attainment counties, which is equivalent to an 8.9% decrease. This point
estimate leads us to believe that the CAAAs did have a significant effect on concentrations at monitor
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locations with recorded ambient concentrations above 50 µg/m3 in non-attainment counties.
Model (3) includes a dummy for monitors having recorded an annual average concentration in
excess of the annual standard during the previous period and being located in an attainment county.
The reason a monitor can have recorded concentrations in violation of the standard for a given year
and the county still being in attainment in the next period, is that non-attainment designation is
based on a three-year average, not a single year. The coefficient estimate for the parameter α3
is large, negative and statistically different from zero. The point estimate indicates that ambient
concentrations at monitors, that are located in counties not in violation of the national standard
but are still above the 50 µg/m3 national standard for non-attainment, have experienced a drop in
concentrations of 7.19 µg/m3 . The coefficient estimate for α2 remains almost unchanged. While we
fail to reject the null of α2 = α3 in this model, we note that the point estimate for dirty monitors in
attainment counties is a larger negative number than for the non-attainment counties.10
Models (1) - (3) control for year and monitor specific unobservables. Models (4) - (6) add
monitor specific time trends to the model, which allows for differential trends in the unobservables
at the monitor level. The results are even stronger for these models. The estimated treatment effects
increase by roughly 1-2 µg/m3 , suggesting that concentrations at monitors with concentrations higher
than the federal annual standard dropped by 7.57 and 8.11 µg/m3 in non-attainment and attainment
counties respectively.
We interpret these empirical results as being consistent with regulators taking strong action
at locations, which are out of attainment with a national standard. As outlined in section 2.2, the
motivation in non-attainment counties comes from being obligated to undertake measures to bring
all monitors in a county back into attainment. The motivation for air quality managers in attainment
counties is to prevent the future costs of being designated as non attainment.
The treatment effect so far has assumed a discrete threshold at the federal standard. One could
build an argument that there is a stronger regulatory response at monitors far above the standard.
We conduct the following two step experiment, which allows for a flexible functional form of the
response. The first step of the experiment sets the threshold for defining OOCi,t at a value φ ranging
from 10µg/m3 to 75 µg/m3 . For each value of φ we estimate equation (4) and record our estimates
for α2 and α3 as well as their estimated standard errors. Figure (4)plots the point estimates and 90%
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confidence interval for the estimated α2 and α3 for each value φ. The plot shows a small negative
effect at low cutoff levels, yet the magnitude of the effect grows drastically as we let the cutoff value
increase. Testing for non-linearities, we cannot conclusively favor a linear versus an exponential fit, yet
it is clear that air quality managers take stronger actions at higher levels of ambient concentrations.
Further, the shape of the curve is not qualitatively different for attainment versus non-attainment
counties. It is quite apparent from both plots that the dirtier the monitor, the larger the response.
The results so far have focused on explaining impacts of regulation on annual average concentrations. Counties can be designated as being out of attainment by violating the daily standard as
well. We therefore estimate the same class of models, but using the number of days each monitor is
in violation of the daily standard as the dependent variable. As in the previous specifications, we use
county non-attainment status as our pooled measure of treatment. We then relax the pooled treatment assumption by estimating separate treatment effects for monitors which were in violation of the
daily standard in the previous period for both attainment and non-attainment counties. Specifically,
OOCt−1 is now defined according to whether the monitor violated the daily standard in the previous period. Table III lists the results, which are qualitatively identical to those shown in Table II.
County non-attainment status does not have a statistically detectable effect on the number of daily
violations. However, monitors which had violated the standard in previous periods did experience
a drop of 3.05 days for non-attainment counties and a drop of 2.17 days for counties in attainment.
This suggests again, that regulation affects both types of counties at the monitors in violation of the
federal standard.
In order to check for robustness of our results, we conduct two additional estimations. First,
we exclude the years after PM2.5 was moved into regulatory focus. While all PM2.5 is also PM10 , the
reverse is not true. Table IV shows these results in columns (1) - (3). The results are almost identical
to those presented in Table II. Next we acknowledge California’s long history of stringent air quality
regulation. While California is subject to the same federal standards, it has developed quite effective
air quality regulatory institutions, such as the California Air Resources Board and the Air Quality
Management Districts. These institutions have pioneered implementation of many regulatory tools,
such as the RECLAIM program. Southern California also has historically suffered from the worst
air quality in the nation. In order to ensure that California is not driving our results, we exclude
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California monitors from our sample and rerun the models including monitor specific time trends.
Models (4)-(6) in Table IV show these results. Again, these results are almost identical to those
shown in Table II reaffirming our confidence in the robustness of our results.
Finally we wanted to examine what we gain from using the monitor specific weather observations. Existing models in the literature have historically used weather measured at the county level.
In order to determine what we gain from using monitor level weather data, we conduct the following
experiment. We estimate model (6) from Table II without the weather variables. We then construct
”county-weather” observations by averaging each weather observation across monitors within a given
county. We then compare these estimated treatment effect parameters to the ones obtained in model
(6) from Table II. The estimated coefficients on the α parameters, which for space reasons are not
shown here, are almost identical across all three specifications. Introducing weather results in slightly
smaller point estimates on the treatment effects. The α coefficients for the county and monitor
weather specifications are identical to the second decimal. We also calculate the marginal effect for
each observation for February and July temperature as well as rainfall. We compare these estimated
marginal effects to the ones obtained from model (6). We find an almost perfect correlation between
the marginal effects from each approach. The smallest of the three Pearson correlation coefficients
is 0.9932. This is an encouraging result, reassuring us that the use of county averaged weather data
does not seem to introduce bias in the estimated coefficients in previous studies.

6.

Conclusions

This study contributes to the literature on the effects of environmental regulation (e.g. [9, 11]) by
testing whether the decline in PM10 concentrations between 1990 and 2005 can be attributed to the
1990 CAAAs. A central point of this work was to stress the importance of spatially disaggregated
analysis motivated by a non-linear dose-response function between mortality and PM10 or the monitor
specificity of the federal regulation.
We have conducted our analysis at the monitor level and allowed the regulation to have a
differential impact on concentrations measured at the monitoring site depending whether a monitor
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recorded concentrations in violation of the national standard and whether a monitor is located in
a county designated as non-attainment. In addition to controlling for the standard determinants of
criteria pollutants changes, we use a novel weather data set, which allows us to construct weather
observations at the pollution monitor location.
Our key finding reveals the importance of spatially disaggregated analysis in order to properly
assess the effects of environmental regulations. First, we estimate a pooled treatment effect, which
captures the average drop in concentrations due to non-attainment designation across all monitors in
a county. For this specification we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. When we allow for
an interaction between non-attainment designation and lagged exceedance of the national standard,
we find a statistically significant and sizeable effect. This heterogenous treatment effect suggests a
potential distributional impact of federal environmental regulations, by creating incentives for local
environmental regulators to target the dirtiest areas. Extending the specification, we find an identical
effect for monitors exceeding the national standard in the previous period in attainment counties.
The magnitude of the estimated effect ranges between 11% and 14%, which is similar to the effect
estimated for TSPs in the 1970s [2, 3]. Further, using a flexible functional form, we show that
reductions in ambient concentrations at dirtier monitors do not only occur right at the regulatory
threshold concentrations, but they are continuous starting at very low concentrations.
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Notes
1

Conversations with local air quality managers confirm that special attention is paid to monitors with recorded

concentrations above the federal standard, regardless of county attainment status.
2

The concentrations examined are second highest daily maximum concentration, mean annual reading, median of

daily maximum July and mean July reading. The mean July reading is significant at the 10% level.
3

For a concise analysis of the health effects from exposure to PM10 , see [5, 7, 10]. For an analysis of the impact of

air pollution on infant health, see [2, 4].
4

In the AQS data, a criteria flag is set based on data completeness criteria so that if it is set to ”Y”, then the

assumption can be made that the data represent the sampling period of the year. These summary criteria are based
on 75% or greater data capture and data reported for all 4 calendar quarters in each year. EPA confirms that we are
using the correct sample of monitor readings.
5

We exclude monitors located in Puerto Rico as well as monitor year observations, which are flagged as observations

tainted by “extreme natural events” beyond human influence.
6

In 1997 the EPA began to regulate fine particulates. Non-attainment designations for fine particulates were first

assigned in 2005. We further do not control for lead non-attainment status.
7

As a replication of EPA’s non-attainment designations, we ran a logit of the 1990 non-attainment designation

on an indicator of whether the three year moving average was in violation of the annual standard and an indicator
of 24-hour standard violations. As we would expect, a violation of the daily standard and a violation of the annual
standard result in equal increases in the probability of being designated as non-attainment. We correctly classified
89.41% of the observations based on this regression, which we interpret as a sign of adequate data quality. [9] also notes
having problems replicating the attainment status designation perfectly. The reason we may not be able to replicate
the attainment assignment perfectly, may be due to the fact that attainment status is assigned based on measured and
modeled air quality concentrations. We could not gain access to the modeled data from the EPA.
8

We also estimated the covariance matrix by clustering at the monitor level and the results are almost identical.

9

[11] controls for the number of polluting facilities at the county level. We do not have access to the confidential

PACE survey data, so cannot control for this. Since we show that the CAAAs work on dirty monitors in both
attainment and non-attainment counties, concerns about bias here are not warranted.
10

While this difference is not statistically significant, one referee raised the concern that these point estimates may

be due to “other trends in PM regulation that only hit the dirtiest monitors, regardless of attainment status.” Since
we cannot explicitly test for this, we have run our models by allowing for attainment status specific trends and the
results are very similar.

20

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online
at Journal of Environmental Economics & Management (doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2008.12.004) published by Elsevier.
Copyright restrictions may apply.

Figure 1: Monitored Counties and Attainment Status

®

Attainment
Non Attainment

Note: Counties are included in the map if they appear in the data for at least two consecutive years. Counties
are shown as non-attainment if they were designated as such for at least one year of our sample.
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Figure 2: Trends of Ambient PM10 Concentration Levels by Attainment Status
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Figure 3: Changes in PM10 Concentrations Prior and Post First Non-Attainment Status Designations
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect for Varying PM10 Cutoff Levels

Note: The vertical axis for the left panel shows the estimated coefficient α2 on the variable I(P M10,t−1 > φ
& Non-Attainment) from model (6) in Table II. The vertical axis for the right panel shows the estimated coefficient
α3 on the variable I(P M10,t−1 > φ & Attainment) from model (6) in Table II. The original model (6) fixes φ at 50
µg/m3 . In this figure we vary it from 10µg/m3 to 75µg/m3 .
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25

Number
of Counties
173
307
410
442
458
515
517
539
531
543
393
371
378
403
390
362
382
346

Number of
Monitors
267
595
781
859
951
1068
1097
1129
1112
1101
815
743
764
765
729
685
762
713

Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

(4)
Population in
Monitored
Counties
(in millions)
81
140
154
158
155
169
168
168
166
172
139
135
134
140
133
129
139
132

(5)
Number of
Monitored
Non-Attainment
Counties
N/A
N/A
64
62
57
69
70
68
67
69
64
61
62
52
46
43
49
44

(6)
Total Number of
Non-Attainment
Counties
(∆ N.Att/∆ Att.)
N/A
N/A
76 (76/0)
76 (0/0)
76 (0/0)
77 (1/0)
83 (6/0)
82 (1/2)
80 (0/2)
78 (0/2)
78 (0/0)
77 (0/1)
70 (0/7)
69 (0/1)
60 (0/9)
56 (0/4)
55 (0/1)
50 (0/5)

(8)
Standard
Deviation
(µg/m3 )
10.30
11.67
10.08
9.43
8.17
8.25
8.73
8.59
7.98
8.45
7.96
8.78
10.99
8.15
9.75
8.93
7.89
8.67

(7)
Mean Annual
Concentrations
(µg/m3 )
33.94
32.31
28.43
27.80
25.57
24.41
24.55
23.81
22.76
22.97
23.53
23.54
23.38
22.47
21.92
22.07
21.03
22.50

(9)
# of Monitors
Exceeding
Daily
Standard
N/A
N/A
59
58
34
31
21
33
25
30
22
29
39
24
31
38
28
33

Note: Ambient concentration data were obtained from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Air Quality Monitoring System. The attainment status
designation was obtained from the corresponding years of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Observations for any given year and monitor were included
if the criteria flag was set to yes, which indicates that a monitor is representative and its yearly weighted arithmetic mean is based on a sufficient number of
samples taken in each quarter of the year. These observations are used for making attainment status designation decisions.

(3)

(2)

(1)

Table I: Summary Statistics: Trends in PM10 Monitoring and Regulation
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Table II: Effect of Attainment Status and Lagged Standard Violations on PM10 Concentrations.
Regressand: ∆ PM10
Non-Attainment (α1 )

(1)
0.173
(0.60)

(2)
0.177
(0.60)
-5.435
(1.00)***

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.13
1912

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.15
1912

I(PM10,t−1 >50 & Non-Attainment) (α2 )
I(PM10,t−1 >50 & Attainment) (α3 )
Monitor FEs
Year FEs
Monitor Trends
Monitor Nonlinear Income
Monitor Nonlinear Weather
County Employment
County Population
Other County Attainment
Observations
R2
Monitor Count

(3)
0.190
(0.60)
-5.450
(1.00)***
-7.191
(1.16)***
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.16
1912

(4)
0.166
(0.68)

(5)
0.213
(0.69)
-7.550
(0.90)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.11
1912

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.14
1912

(6)
0.204
(0.69)
-7.567
(0.90)***
-8.105
(1.70)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.15
1912

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level.
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table III: Effect of Attainment Status and Lagged Standard Violations on Daily Violations (DVs)
PM10 Concentrations.
Regressand: ∆ Daily Violations (DVs)
Non-Attainment (α1 )

(1)
0.043
(0.08)

(2)
0.050
(0.08)
-2.083
(0.30)***

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.01
1912

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.16
1912

I(DVst−1 > 1 & Non-Attainment) (α2 )
I(DVst−1 > 1 & Attainment) (α3 )
Monitor FEs
Year FEs
Monitor Trends
Monitor Nonlinear Income
Monitor Nonlinear Weather
County Employment
County Population
Other County Attainment
Observations
R2
Monitor Count

(3)
0.058
(0.07)
-2.090
(0.30)***
-1.939
(0.40)***
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.2
1912

(4)
0.038
(0.10)

(5)
0.062
(0.08)
-3.081
(0.34)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.01
1912

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.21
1912

Note: Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level.
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(6)
0.071
(0.08)
-3.105
(0.34)***
-2.171
(0.29)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10010
0.24
1912
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Table IV: Robustness Checks for Effect of Attainment Status and Lagged Standard Violations on
PM10 Concentrations: (1) - (3) Subsample Prior to PM2.5 Regulation; (4)- (6) Subsample Without
California
Regressand: ∆ PM10
Non-Attainment (α1 )

(1)
-0.247
(1.54)

(2)
-0.214
(1.46)
-8.149
(1.26)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
6157
0.09
1527

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
6157
0.11
1527

I(PM10,t−1 >50 & Non-Attainment) (α2 )
I(PM10,t−1 >50 & Attainment) (α3 )
Monitor FEs
Year FEs
Monitor Trends
Nonlinear Income
Nonlinear Weather
Other Attainment
California Included
Years > 1997 Included
Observations
R2
Monitor Count

(3)
-0.221
(1.46)
-8.15
(1.26)***
-6.98
(1.96)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
6157
0.12
1527

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the county level.
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(4)
0.235
(0.67)

(5)
0.295
(0.67)
-8.855
(1.17)***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
8867
0.11
1725

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
8867
0.13
1725

(6)
0.283
(0.68)
-8.86
(1.18)***
-8.697
(1.96)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
8867
0.14
1725

